Lessons from Anroop v. Naqvi, ONCA 142
Estate disputes often arise when someone makes a major change to their will late in life, especially when the change seems inconsistent with their earlier wishes.
That was the situation in Anroop v. Naqvi, where the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether a will signed just weeks before the deceased’s death should replace three earlier wills that took a very different approach.
The case is a reminder that when courts review a disputed will, they don’t just look at the document itself. They also look closely at how it was prepared and whether it genuinely reflects the person’s wishes.
What Happened?
Reka Anroop was 87 years old when he died on July 4, 2022. His first three wills, made on February 28, 2021, March 3, 2021, and October 20, 2021, substantially benefited his son Narine, Narine’s common-law spouse Amadai Hardayal, and his grandson Bryan Anroop if Narnie should predecease. Bryan lived with and cared for Reka, while Amadai was his primary caregiver. Bryan and Amadai also paid approximately $75,600 for repairs and renovations to Reka’s home.1
Shortly before the fourth will was made, on March 7, 2022 Reka stated on video that he wanted Amadai and Bryan to have the home and indicated they should not let anyone tell them they had to move out of the house. On March 16, 2022, he instructed his previous solicitor to add their names to title. That solicitor had concerns about Reka’s capacity and declined to act without a medical opinion.2
Two months later, the fourth will, dated May 19, 2022, took a very different approach.
It divided the residue equally among Reka’s four surviving children, including Chandra and the other Respondents, but made no provision whatsoever for Bryan or Amadai.
The fourth will was prepared by a real estate solicitor, Nabeel Naqvi, who rented office space from Chandra Naqvi’s husband and received referrals from him. Mr. Naqvi prepared the Fourth Will without charge, did not provide a reporting letter, and included a drafting error, an erroneous provision concerning sky-diving.3
The validity of the fourth will was challenged by Bryan after Reka’s death. The litigation raised concerns about the circumstances in which the will had been prepared, the authenticity of the signature, Reka’s capacity, whether he knew and approved the will’s contents, and whether he had been subjected to undue influence.
The application judge found that there was a good reason for Reka to disinherit Bryan and Amadai, based on an alleged statement that they had treated Reka badly after leaving the home on May 15, 2022, which they were forced to do due to harassment by three of Reka’s children, including Chandra. The Court of Appeal found that conclusion to be a palpable and overriding error of fact because, on the date of the alleged statement, Bryan and Amadai were still living with and caring for Reka; they did not leave until more than two months later.4
The Court of Appeal also considered expert evidence concluding that the signature on the fourth will was not Reka’s. It was unnecessary to make a final finding of forgery. The reports were sufficient to establish suspicious circumstances because, if accepted, they tended to negative knowledge and approval and testamentary capacity.5
As a result, the court was required to determine whether the fourth will was valid, whether Reka knew and approved its contents, whether he had testamentary capacity, and whether the will resulted from undue influence.
The Issues Before the Court
The Court of Appeal was asked to consider, among other things: “Did the application judge err in:
(1) concluding there was insufficient evidence of suspicious circumstances to displace the presumption that the Fourth Will was properly executed;
(2) misapprehending, disregarding, or failing to accept the uncontradicted conclusion of the Appellants’ handwriting expert, Dr. Shabnam Kaur, that the signature on the Fourth Will was a forgery;
(3) refusing or failing to consider that Mr. Naqvi was in a conflict of interest;
(4) concluding that the Fourth Will was not the subject of unconscionable procurement;
(5) concluding there was no undue influence exerted on Reka to sign the Fourth Will;
(6) granting the Respondent leave to amend her claim in the SCC Action, which remedy had not been sought; and
(7) refusing to grant costs of the Application to the Appellants.”6
What the Court Decided
Issue #1-2-3: The Fourth Will is Not Valid
As the propounder of the fourth will, Chandra bore the burden of proving that the will was properly executed and that Reka knew and approved its contents.
Suspicious circumstances may arise from the preparation of the will, questions about the testator’s capacity, or circumstances suggesting coercion or fraud. The burden of establishing suspicious circumstances is not onerous; it is met by evidence that, if accepted, would tend to negative knowledge and approval or capacity.7
The Court of Appeal identified several suspicious circumstances.
First, Mr. Naqvi’s relationship with Chandra’s husband created an apparent conflict of interest. The application judge had concluded that the conflict was overcome, but the Court of Appeal held that this was a legal error because “a conflict of interest, by definition, results in divided loyalties.”8
Second, the handwriting evidence raised a serious concern about whether Reka had signed the document. The Court did not need to finally determine whether the signature was forged. The uncontradicted expert reports were sufficient to trigger closer scrutiny of the will.9
Third, the will contained an erroneous sky-diving provision, and Mr. Naqvi had not reviewed the entire document with Reka. Those circumstances supported the conclusion that there was no reliable evidence Reka knew and approved the will’s contents.10
Finally, the fourth will represented a dramatic departure from three recent wills and was inconsistent with Reka’s video statement and March 16 instructions concerning the home. The Court of Appeal rejected the suggested explanation that Reka had disinherited Bryan and Amadai because they had treated him badly after leaving the home. That explanation was inconsistent with the chronology.11
Suspicious circumstances do not invalidate a will on their own, but they significantly increase the level of scrutiny applied to the evidence. Once the ordinary presumptions are rebutted, the propounder must establish testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval through reliable evidence.12
The Court of Appeal held that suspicious circumstances upend the presumptions of knowledge and approval and testamentary capacity. The propounder must then establish both capacity and knowledge and approval.13
The Court’s concern was not limited to whether Reka could understand the general nature of a will. The circumstances required reliable evidence that he understood and approved the specific document that had been prepared for him.
That evidence was lacking. The will contained an erroneous provision, had not been adequately reviewed with Reka, and was prepared in circumstances involving a divided loyalty. The signature evidence further undermined confidence in the document. The radical change from the three previous wills, together with Reka’s recent statements and instructions, also raised questions about whether the fourth will represented his actual intentions.14
The Court therefore declared the fourth will invalid.15
Capacity and knowledge and approval are distinct inquiries. Evidence that a testator signed a document will not necessarily establish that the testator understood and approved its contents, particularly where the will was prepared in suspicious circumstances.
Issue #4: Unconscionable Procurement
The court articulated uncertainty as to the existence of the doctrine of unconscionable procurement stated, “leave a determination of whether the doctrine exists to a case I which that matter is squarely raised, and fully argued and decided at first instance.”16
Issue #5: Undue Influence
The Court of Appeal held that undue influence independently invalidated the fourth will. Undue influence exists when a testator is coerced into doing something the testator does not wish to do. It may be established through circumstantial evidence, and the burden remains on the party asserting it.17
The Court identified several relevant indicators, including vulnerability or dependency, family conflict or bereavement, questionable confidentiality and independence of legal advice, a substantial unexplained departure from prior wills, and statements suggesting that the will may not reflect the testator’s wishes.18
Those indicators were present. Reka was elderly, medically vulnerable, and dependent. He had recently lost his son and was affected by family conflict. The legal advice was not demonstrably independent, and the fourth will represented a dramatic and unexplained departure from three recent wills. The new will was also inconsistent with Reka’s video statement and his March 16 instructions concerning the home.19
The Court declined to decide whether “unconscionable procurement” exists as an independent doctrine, noting that the issue required full argument in an appropriate case.20
Undue influence need not be proved by direct evidence of threats or coercion. A combination of vulnerability, dependency, family conflict, questionable advice, and an unexplained testamentary change may support a finding of undue influence.
Issue #6 & #7: Validity of the Will and Costs
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and declared the fourth will invalid. The Small Claims Court action was dismissed because it was contingent on the fourth will being valid.21
The Court also set aside the application judge’s costs order. The application judge had provided no reasons for concluding that public-policy considerations were not engaged, which was a legal error.22
The Court explained that estate-litigation costs require consideration of whether the litigation was reasonably brought to determine the validity of the will, whether it reflected the deceased’s intentions, whether it was executed by the deceased, and whether it was made with capacity. Where public-policy considerations are engaged, reasonable full-indemnity costs will traditionally be paid from the estate, although a different or blended award may be justified.23
The Court fixed the costs of the application and motion at $175,000 all-inclusive. Chandra was ordered to pay $105,000 personally on a substantial-indemnity basis, while $70,000 was payable to the appellants from the estate. Chandra was required to bear her own costs. The appellants’ appeal costs were fixed at $45,000 all-inclusive, payable from the estate, with Chandra again bearing her own appeal costs.24
Estate litigation may properly be funded by the estate where it is reasonably brought to determine the validity and proper administration of the estate. However, a beneficiary or propounder may face substantial personal costs where the circumstances justify departing from the usual approach.
Why This Decision Matters
In my view, the most interesting aspect of this decision is not necessarily the finding that the fourth will was invalid. Rather, the case highlights the cumulative effect of circumstances that, considered together, undermined confidence in the document.
The decision highlights that courts examine not only the final testamentary plan but also the process by which it was created. A will prepared quickly, without adequate review, in the presence of divided loyalties, may attract scrutiny even where the document appears formally complete.
Estate disputes rarely arise because of a single event. More often, they emerge from a combination of circumstances that collectively raise concerns about fairness, transparency, intention, or decision-making.
This decision provides another example of how courts approach those concerns in practice. The conflict, the late-life change, the questionable explanation, the signature evidence, the drafting errors, and the absence of adequate review were not isolated details. Together, they created a process that the Court could not reliably connect to Reka’s informed and voluntary intentions.
The case demonstrates the importance of contemporaneous records. The absence of a reporting letter, the failure to review the entire will with Reka, the erroneous provision, and the limited evidence explaining the change in testamentary intention all contributed to the Court’s concerns.25
The broader lesson is that a will’s formal appearance cannot substitute for reliable evidence about how it was prepared and whether it reflects the testator’s genuine wishes.
A significant departure from prior wills is not automatically invalid. It does, however, require a credible explanation supported by reliable evidence. In Anroop, the proposed explanation was contradicted by the chronology and by Reka’s recent statements and instructions.26
Contact Barriston Law
If you are concerned about a last-minute change to a will, questions surrounding capacity, allegations of undue influence, or the conduct of an executor or estate trustee, you do not have to navigate those issues alone.
Barriston Law’s Estate Litigation team advises clients across Ontario on will challenges, dependant support claims, executor disputes, powers of attorney litigation, and trust and estate disputes.
To discuss your situation, contact Barriston Law for a confidential consultation.
Written by Vanessa Locicero
[1]Anroop v. Naqvi, 2026 ONCA 142, (CanLII), at paras 1, and 10–17. [2] Ibid at paras 22–25. [3] Ibid at para 26–29. [4] Ibid at paras 54–57. [5] Ibid at paras 63–66. [6] Ibid at paras at para 51. [7] Ibid at paras 53, 58. [8] Ibid at paras 59–62. [9] Ibid at paras 63–66. [10] Ibid at paras 67–70. [11] Ibid at paras 54–57, 70–71. [12] Ibid at paras 58, 70–71. [13] Ibid at para 58. [14] Ibid at paras 63–71. [15] Ibid at paras 7–9, 107. [16] Ibid at para 74. [17] Ibid at para 76. [18] Ibid at para 77. [19] Ibid at paras 78–85. [20] Ibid at paras 72–74. [21] Ibid at paras 85–87, 107. [22] Ibid at paras 88, 93–97. [23] Ibid at paras 89–96. [24] Ibid at paras 98–106, 109(1)–(4). [25] Ibid at paras 26–29, 67–70. [26] Ibid at paras 54–57, 78–85.